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NOTES
Fishing for the Smoking Gun: The
Need for British Courts to Grant
American Style Extraterritorial
Discovery Requests in U.S. IndustryWide Tort Actions
ABSTRACT

Industry-wide tort litigation, such as tobacco and gun
litigation,poses a new problem for extraterritorialdiscovery.
These suits allege conspiracieson the part of the tobacco and
gun industries to conceal the dangers of theirproducts from
the public. Much of the evidence needed to prove the
industries' knowledge is in their possession.
These
industries are international with companies located in the
United Kingdom. Under U.S. discovery law the evidence is
discoverable,but such is not the case under British discovery
law. Therefore, the evidence and witnesses located in the
United Kingdom are outside the grasp of U.S. plaintiffs. The
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
and Commercial Matters establishesproceduresfor obtaining
evidence abroadbut does not offer any relief to U.S. plaintiffs
seeking evidence in the United Kingdom in industry-wide tort
litigation.
This note explores the problems faced by U.S. litigants
seeking evidence in the United Kingdom for use in industrywide tort litigation in the United States. It includes an
examination of U.S. and British discovery procedures and
compares and contrasts them.
It also examines the
applicableprovisions of the Convention and the Evidence Act
of 1975 in the United Kingdom which implemented the
Convention in that country. This note identifies the problems
experienced by U.S. plaintiffs in tobacco and gun litigation. It
suggests a solution to extraterritorial discovery disputes
between the United States and the United Kingdom in the
form of an amendment to the Evidence Act of 1975 to allow
British courts greater discretion in granting U.S. discovery
requests in industry-wide tort litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a U.S. litigant suing a British gun
manufacturer for the negligent manufacture of a gun that
resulted in the death of your child.' Your claim alleges that the
gun manufacturer was aware of a safety mechanism that could be
installed in the gun at the time of manufacture that would reduce
the chances of accidentally discharging the gun. In fact, the
manufacturer of the specific gun involved was not the only gun
manufacturer aware of this safety mechanism. You suspect that
the entire gun industry decided to conceal the information about
the safety mechanism because it would be too costly to install,

1.
This hypothetical is drawn from the facts of cases facing gun
manufacturers today in U.S. courts. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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would raise gun prices, and would result in reduced gun sale
profits.
In order to prove your claim, you must gain access to
documents held by the manufacturer in the United Kingdom. The
manufacturer is physically in possession of all the documents you
need to prove your claim. You have one problem. You will be
unable to obtain these documents because the British courts will
not grant requests for discovery that lack specificity, and you do
not know exactly which documents you need. Thus, you will
have no case without these industry documents and research
files. By contrast, most of the documents would be available
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules);
however, because the manufacturer is not located in the United
States, the Federal Rules do not apply.
This note addresses the problem of extraterritorial discovery
disputes between the United States and the United Kingdom in
the new wave of industry-wide tort litigation.
Differing
conceptions of, and approaches to, discovery by the United States
and the United Kingdom have resulted in disputes when litigants
in the United States seek evidence located in the United Kingdom.
In an age of globalization, the advent of tobacco litigation and the
rising threat of gun litigation have opened the door to more
conflict as corporations manipulate the international system to
strategically avoid disclosure of damaging documents.
Part II of this Note lays out the basic procedural principles of
discovery in the United States as prescribed by the Federal Rules
and contrasts them to the discovery procedures utilized in the
United Kingdom. Part III explores the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, the
most
significant
current
international
convention
on
extraterritorial discovery. In particular, this section examines the
key provisions of the Convention, as well as the international
policies behind the Convention, to better understand its role in
extraterritorial discovery disputes. Part IV will focus on the
problem of obtaining evidence in the United Kingdom for use in
litigation in the United States. Particular attention is given to the
U.S. approach to extraterritorial discovery and its implementation
of the Convention, as well as the United Kingdom's approach in
response to discovery requests from the United States. Part V will
explore the new challenges presented as industry-wide tort
litigation explodes and goes international. This section will focus
primarily on the experience, and outcomes of tobacco litigation as
an example of what could be expected in future litigation. It will
also explore the lessons learned from tobacco litigation and the
methods corporate defendants have used to manipulate the
system to avoid disclosure. Finally, Part VI will examine the
problems associated with employing existing mechanisms for
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extraterritorial discovery and will suggest a possible solution to
resolve the discovery conflict: an amendment to the United
Kingdom's Evidence Act of 1975 to allow courts greater discretion
in executing discovery requests from the United States.

II. DIFFERING CONCEPTS OF DISCOVERY IN LITIGATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United States and the United Kingdom have different
views on the limits of discovery in litigation. These differences
range from what information is discoverable and when, if at all, it
Although discovery in the United States is
is discoverable.
derived from procedure in the United Kingdom, the Federal Rules2
have greatly expanded upon common law notions of discovery.
In fact, the liberal U.S. system of discovery has come under
attack from both common law and civil law countries.3 Though
the same word, "discovery," is used to describe both the U.S. and
British systems of trial disclosure, the meanings are very
different.
A. Liberal Discovery in the United States
The United States has the most liberal discovery procedures
in the world. 4 Rule 1 of the Federal Rules establishes that the
rules are to "be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." s
Therefore, the Federal Rules are read liberally to allow the
litigants to engage in a "fair" procedure, with limited surprise.
Most of the information sought by litigants is easily
Most discovery occurs
discoverable in the United States.
pretrial.6
Rule 26(b)(1) allows parties to "obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
."7
It is
subject matter involved in the pending action .

See Collins, infra note 140, at 27.
2.
3.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
4.
See generally FED. R. Civ. P.
5.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1. In its entirety, the rule reads: "These rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated
in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.
6.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
7.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The full text of Rule 26(b)(1) reads:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or
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important to recognize that the relevance requirement during
discovery is more broad than the relevance requirement at trial.8
Relevance at the discovery stage focuses on the general subject
matter, whereas at trial relevance is limited to the specific issues
of the particular case. 9
Most information a party seeks in
discovery will conform to the lenient relevance standard of Rule
26(b)(1).
Rule 26(b)(1) does not require that the information sought
during discovery be admissible at trial, but only that it appear
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."' 0 The fact that the discoverable evidence need not be
admissible at trial makes the discovery process in the United
States quite broad. What British and other European courts refer
to as "fishing" expeditions is an accepted component of American
civil procedure." It is commonplace for parties to use discovery
to formulate the issues of the action and to uncover leads on
additional evidence for their case. 12 In fact, the Federal Rules are
designed to achieve such goals.
Discovery in the United States is obtained by way of five
different
categories
of disclosure:
automatic
disclosure,
depositions, interrogatories, production and inspection of
documents and property, and requests for admissions.' 3 With
the exception of automatic disclosure, these modes of discovery
are also found in common law judicial systems. 14 Because of

to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information
sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
Id.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 104.
See id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 104.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
See infra note 44.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5).

Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods:
depositions upon oral examinations or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter
upon land or other property under Rule 34 or 45(a)(1)(C), for inspection
and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for
admission.
Id.
14.
See NEwMAN & ZAsLowsKY, infra note 55, § 1.2.1 at 7-8 (discussing
procedures in England and Commonwealth countries).
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in the
Rule 26(b)(1), however, their application is far more liberal
5
United States than in any other common law jurisdiction.1
6
It is
Automatic disclosure is a distinctly American creation.'
a formulation of what has been called "court-ordered
interrogatories." 17 Rule 26(a)(1) mandates the disclosure of four
categories of information before any discovery requests are made:
the names of individuals likely to have discoverable information
and means of contacting them, if known; a copy of or description
and location of all documents in possession of the party; a
computation of any category of damages; and any insurance
8
The names and
agreement which may satisfy a judgment.'
documents disclosed depend on the specificity of the pleadings or
19
Therefore, very
the particularity with which the facts are pled.
specific pleadings can result in a great deal of automatic
disclosure.
There has been a great deal of debate over the adoption of
Rule 26(a)(1). 20 Proponents of the rule focus primarily on its

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 6-7.
See Collins, infra note 140, at 27-28.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). The Rule reads in relevant part:

(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or
directed by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery
request, provide to other parties:
the name and, if known, the address and telephone
(A)
number of each individual likely to have discoverable information
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,
identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or description by category and location of, all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession,
custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as
under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not
privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is
based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of
injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance
business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may
be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments
made to satisfy the judgment.
Id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(B) (both sections of the rule stating that
19.
the disclosure shall be made if "relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings... ").
See generally Griffin Terry, Comment, A Critical Analysis of the
20.
Formulation and Content of the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 869 (1995). See generally Amendments to the
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ability to move cases forward more quickly. 2 ' They find support
in Rule 1, which sets out the goal of the Federal Rules: the
"speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."2 2 The
second argument proponents of Rule 26(a)(1) make is that it will
reduce the expense of litigation. 23 A primary aim of automatic
disclosure is to help parties avoid costly, expansive disclosure for
the purpose of "fishing" for information, because the parties will
have essential information disclosed to them at the onset of the
25
4
As a result, issues will be narrowed more swiftly.
litigation. 2
Furthermore, proponents assert that automatic disclosure does
not expand discovery, but merely expedites the discovery
26
process.
Critics of automatic disclosure do not believe that its benefits
outweigh its costs.2 7 These critics fear the burden unnecessary
disclosure creates. 28 Justice Scalia observed in his dissent to the
amendments to Rule 26 that irrelevant information would likely
29
Automatic
be disclosed as a result of mandatory disclosure.
would
have
that
in
cases
disclosure is particularly unnecessary
otherwise
would
any
disclosure
before
terminated
or
been
settled
have taken place. 3 0 Furthermore, it is burdensome to require an
attorney to decide what information needs to be disclosed before
any requests have been made.3 1 This is never more apparent
3 2
than in the attorney-client relationship context.
The amendments, despite the controversy surrounding them,
are based on the principle of reducing unfair surprise in
The Federal Rules are constructed to avoid the
litigation.3 3
34
By
surprises which other legal systems occasionally produce.
to
parties
for
the
aim
Rules
the
Federal
unfair
surprise,
reducing

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, (U.S. Apr. 22, 1993) (Scalia, J.
J., dissenting).
21.
See Terry, supra note 20, at 927.
22.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
23.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
24,
See Terry, supranote 20, at 927.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 929-30.
27.
See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 U.S.L.W.
4365, (U.S. Apr. 22, 1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 4392.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
See id. (observing that attorneys must exercise a great deal of
31.
judgment, putting strain on their ethical obligations to their clients).
See id. Particularly, attorneys must balance their obligation to
32.
represent their clients with the requirement to disclose information to the
opposing side prior to any requests for information. Id.
33.
See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. advisory committee's notes (amended
1993).
See id.
34.
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arrive at the truth and achieve justice with the least cost and in
the quickest time.3 s
B. A More ConservativeApproach to Discovery
in the United Kingdom

Discovery in the Unites Kingdom is far more limited than
discovery in the United States.3 6 The concepts the two nations
have of discovery are quite different, despite using the same word
to describe the process. 3 7 Order 24 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court governs discovery in the United Kingdom. 38 Unlike Rules
26 through 37 of the Federal Rules in the United States, Order 26
takes a far more conservative approach to discovery. 3 9 Pretrial
discovery, as it is known in the United States, does not exist in
the United Kingdom. 4 0 Parties make discovery at the close of the
pleadings by exchanging lists of relevant documents to be
produced. 41 Therefore, because the pleadings have been closed,
the issues have already been identified. 4 2 This is in contrast to
the role discovery plays in formulating the issues in the United
States. 43 In the United Kingdom, allowing discovery to take place
before the issues have been formulated would allow "fishing
expeditions" to take place, a practice the English explicitly
reject. 4 4
Another difference is that discovery in the United Kingdom is
limited to the parties to the litigation. 45 The protection of
witnesses and third parties from pretrial disclosure of evidence
and documents has long been a concern in the United
Kingdom. 4 6 Third parties are protected from pretrial disclosure of
documents and oral and written testimony, 4 7 which is quite
different from the United States procedure of compelling all forms
of discovery upon third party witnesses of non-privileged

35.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
36.
See NEWMAN & ZASLOWSKY, infra note 55, § 1.2.1 at 7-8; Collins, infra
note 140, at 27-28.
37.
McCLEAN, infra note 39, at 60.
38.
See R.S.C. Order 24, r. 1(1).
39.

See DAVID MCCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 59-62 (1992).

40.

Id. at 60.

41.

See MCCLEAN, supranote 39.

42.
43.

MCCLEAN, supranote 39, at 60.
See discussion supra Part II.A.

44.

McCLEAN, supranote 39, at 60.

45.
Id.
46.
See id. at 60-61 for a discussion and account of the English hostility
towards discovery from third parties. Particular attention is given to statements of
various Lords expressing their disapproval. Id.
47.
Id. at 60.
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information. 48 Furthermore, the "mere witness" rule prohibits
making a witness a party to an action for the purpose of
compelling discovery. 4 9 One exception to this rule in the United
Kingdom is that a witness who has liability to the plaintiff for the
wrong must disclose information pertaining to that wrong if the
plaintiff has no intention of pursuing a claim against that
witness. s ° Other exceptions involve personal injury or death
actions. s
There are strict
limitations, however, placed on
52
disclosure in such actions.
In the United Kingdom all discovery is limited to the
discovery of documents.5 3 This is made manifest by the rules in
Order 24, which make reference only to the documents to be
disclosed.5 4 A party may serve written interrogatories on the
opposing party; however, this practice is distinct from the practice
in the United States.5 5 The interrogatories pertain only to
56
documents, which will only be explained by witnesses at trial.
Therefore, the discovery procedure in the United Kingdom is quite
limited.

III. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD
IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS
The
most
important
international
agreement
on
extraterritorial discovery is the Hague Evidence Convention (the
Convention).5 7 The Convention has serious implications on the
way extraterritorial discovery is conducted between signatory

48.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1), supra note 7 and accompanying text. See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5), supranote 13 and accompanying text.
49.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 60-61 (discussing the "mere witness" rule
and objections to it).
50.
Id. at 60.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 61. Specifically, in such actions discovery can take place against
individuals who may be a party to the action before the start of the proceedings
and then after such time against third parties as long as there is no injury to the
public interest. Id.
53.
R.S.C. Order 24, r. 1-6 (making reference only to documents to be
disclosed).
54.
Id.
55.
See LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & DAVID
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES § 1.2.1. at 7 (1996).

ZASLOWSKY,

LITIGATING

56.
Id. In fact, witnesses may never have the opportunity to explain
documents obtained through interrogatories if they are not questioned on them at
trial. Id. This is in stark contrast to U.S. procedure, which permits depositions of
witnesses prior to trial, during which documents obtained through discovery may
be explained. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27.
57.
Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other
Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 754 (1983).
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states.5 8 The Convention, though not the only international
agreement on extraterritorial discovery, is the most significant
This
because of its impact on international litigation.5 9
multilateral treaty is greatly needed because of differing methods
among countries for conducting discovery. It establishes a set of
guidelines and procedures for signatory countries regarding
obtaining evidence abroad.6 0 Interpretation of the Convention,
particularly regarding whether it is binding authority on all
61
discovery disputes, however, has varied among nations.
Therefore, questions still surround the role of the Convention in
the international community.
A. The CentralProvisions of the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad
The Convention established important common procedures
The scope of the
for conducting extraterritorial discovery.6 2
Convention is "civil and commercial matters." 63 The Convention
establishes three procedures for obtaining evidence from a foreign
state: letters of request, use of a diplomatic6 4officer or consular
agent, and use of an appointed commissioner.
1. Letters of Request
6S
Chapter 1 of the Convention governs letters of request.

Letters of request are made by a trial court of the requesting state
to a competent authority of the state in which the evidence is
located. 66 The letter of request may be made for the purpose of
obtaining evidence or for the performance of some other judicial

58.
See id. at 754-58. The signatory states now include Barbados, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Id. at 54.
59.
See id. at 754-58.
Id. at 754.
60.
See id. at 758-61.
61.
See id. at 754-56.
62.
The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
63.
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, art. 1, 23
U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Convention]. It is important to note, however, that the
terms "commercial" and "civil" are not defined anywhere in the treaty. James S.
McLean, The Hague Evidence Convention: Its Impact on American Civil Procedure,9
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 17, 26 (1986). This has led to a great deal of
confusion among U.S. courts and foreign courts over whether the Convention
applies to administrative proceedings. Id. at 26-27.
64.
Oxman, supra note 57, at 754-56.
Convention, supranote 63, Ch. I, at 2557.
65.
Id. Ch. I, art. 1, at 2557.
66.
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act. 6 7 Litigants may use this method to examine or question
persons6 8 and to inspect documents and real or personal
property. 6 9
Article 3 specifies the information that must be
included in the letter of request, including: (1) the authority
making the request and the authority requested to execute it, if
71
known; 70 (2) the names of the parties and their representatives;
(3) the type of proceeding for which the evidence is needed and
any other necessary information; 7 2 and (4) the requested evidence
or judicial act to be performed. 73
Concerns about letters of
request not containing enough information prompted the creation
of a model letter of request in 1985. 7 4 The model letter of request
provides a "check list" of information that is needed for proper
execution of a request. 7 S Use of the model letter of request is not
76
mandatory, although it is strongly recommended.
Articles 4 through 6 lay out other requirements for letters of
request. 7 7 Article 4 establishes that letters of request are to be
written in the language of the executing state or be accompanied
by an appropriate translation. 7 8 The Convention, however, also
allows for letters of request to be made in English or French as
long as the executing state has made no reservation on the
matter. 7 9
States may specify languages in which letters of
request may be made. 80 If a letter of request does not comply
with the requirements set forth by the Convention, Article 5
requires the executing state to notify the requesting state of any
objection. 8 1 Article 6 provides that if an authority receiving a

67.
Id.
68.
Id. Ch. I, art. 3, at 2558. The subsection reads: The letter shall specify
"the names and addresses of the persons to be examined." Id. Ch. I, art. 3(f), at
2558. The subsection reads: The letter shall specify "the questions to be put to
the persons to be examined or a statement of the subject-matter about which they
are to be examined." Id.
69.
Id. Ch. I, art. 3(g), at 2558. The subsection reads: The letter shall
specify "the documents or other property, real or personal, to be inspected." Id.
70.
Id. Ch. I, art. 3(a), at 2558.
71.
Id. Ch. I, art. 3(b), at 2558.
72.
Id. Ch. I, art. 3(c), at 2558.
73.
Id. Ch. I, art. 3(d), at 2558.
74.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 92. The need for a model form was
considered by the Special Commissions of 1978 and 1985. Id. They were
particularly concerned with making sure letters of request identified the specific
nature of the requested evidence. Id. Another concern prompting a model letter of
request was that different legal systems lead to interpretive problems with legal
terms. Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Convention, supranote 63, Ch. I, arts. 4-6, at 2559-60.
78.
Convention, supranote 63, Ch. I, art. 4, at 2559.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. Ch.I, art. 5, at 2560.
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letter of request is not competent to execute it, it should transfer
82
the request to the competent authority.
The Convention also requires that the laws of the authority
making the request and the authority from which the evidence is
requested must be taken into account.8 3 For example, if an oath
is required by the laws of the requesting state, it must be
specified in the request.8 4 Article 9 mandates that the methods
and procedures of the executing authority be followed. 8 5 Article 9
also allows the requesting state to specify any procedures it
wishes to have applied, which are not incompatible with the laws
of the executing authority or impossible of performance as a
matter of practicality.8 6
The Convention has encouraged
executing states to conform their procedures to meet the needs of
the requesting state.8 7 Furthermore, Article 9 mandates that a
88
"Letter of Request shall be executed expeditiously."
The execution of letters of request is addressed in articles 10
through 12.89 Article 10 requires the executing state to apply the
appropriate measures of its internal law in executing letters of
request.90 The privilege of a witness to refuse to give evidence is
addressed by Article 11.91 Generally, the privilege may arise from
the law of the executing state or the law of the requesting state, if
specified in the letter of request. 9 2 The requesting authority may

82.
83.

Id. Ch.I, art. 6, at 2560.
See MCCLEAN, supranote 39, at 91-92.

84.

Id.

85.
Convention, supra note 63, at Ch. I, art. 9, at 2551. "The judicial
authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its own law as to the
methods and procedures to be followed." Id.
86.
Id. Notably, one commentator has observed that "incompatible" should
not be interpreted to mean "different," but rather that the procedure is
constitutionally or statutorily prohibited by the executing state. See MCCLEAN,
supra note 39, at 94. Furthermore, McClean observed that the inconvenience of
the executing state is not an acceptable ground for refusing to execute a special
procedure.
Id. The Convention rejects inconvenience in the interest of the
requesting state, which may only be able to accept evidence obtained by special
procedures. Id.
87.
See MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 95. McClean points out, for example,
that a civil law state may appoint a commissioner from the requesting common
law state to carry out the special procedure unfamiliar to civil law courts. Id.
88.
Convention, supra note 63, Ch. I, art. 9, at 2561. The 1985 Special
Commission obtained estimates on the time it took to execute a letter of request.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 95. A common response was three months. Id. To
shorten the response time, a response date and explanation are questions
included in the model letter of request. Id.
89.
Convention, supra note 63, Ch. I, arts. 10-12, at 2561-63.
90.
Id. Ch. I, art. 10, at 2561-62.
91.
Id. Ch. I, art. 11, at 2562.
92.
Id.
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be asked to confirm a privilege taken under its law.9 3 Article 11
94
allows a state to recognize privileges and duties of a third state.
9
Notably, the United Kingdom has not made such a declaration.
Article 12 specifically lays out the circumstances under which a
state may refuse a letter of request. 9 6 The two acceptable reasons
are if the request is not within the judiciary's functions 97 or if the
state fears that its sovereignty or security may be prejudiced.9 8
An executing state, however, cannot deny a request by claiming
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction or by asserting that its laws
do not permit such a claim. 9 9
2. Taking of Evidence by Diplomatic Officers, Consular Agents,
and Commissioners
Diplomatic officers, consular agents, and commissioners may
take evidence according to the procedures set out in Chapter II of
the Convention.' 0 0 One limit on the power of these officials to
take evidence is that a contracting state may require prior
permission. 10
Articles 15 and 16 distinguish between taking
evidence from a witness who is a national of the consular agent's
state and a witness who is a national of another state. 102 Both
articles allow consular agents to take evidence without
compulsion, although Article
16 adds two additional

93.

Id. This practice is used in the interest of protecting the witness.
McClean suggests a requesting state anticipate
any claims of privilege that may be made under its own law. Id.
94.
Convention, supranote 63, Ch. I, art. 11, at 2562.
95.
See MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 96. This is likely due to the United
Kingdom's conservative approach to discovery within its own territory and
extraterritorial discovery. See discussion supraPart II.B.
96.
Convention, supranote 63, Ch. I, art. 12, at 2562-63.
97.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 93. McClean points out that requests for
public records are not within some states'judicial functions. Id.
98.
Id. McClean cites Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
[1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.) as an example of a request being denied because it infringed
on the sovereignty of a state. Id.
99.
Convention, supra note 63, Ch. I, art. 12, at 2562-63.
100. MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 101. McClean notes that this section of
the Convention identifies the significant difference between common law, for
which the taking of evidence by consuls and commissioners is accepted, and civil
law countries, in which evidence is taken by the judge. Id. Private parties taking
evidence may be seen as invading judicial sovereignty. Id. Chapter II of the
Convention, drawing from United Kingdom bilateral agreements, successfully
reconciles these differences. Id.
101. Convention, supranote 63, Ch. II, arts. 15-17, at 2564-65.
102. Id. Ch. I, arts. 15-16, at 2564-65. Article 15 applies to a consular
agent taking evidence from nationals of the state he represents for use in
proceedings in the state he represents. Id. Ch. I, art. 15, at 2564-65. Article 16
applies to a consular agent taking evidence from a national of the state in which
he is exercising his functions or if a third state for use in proceedings in the state
he represents. Id. Chapter If, art. 16, at 2564-65.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 96.
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requirements because it deals with nationals of a state other than
the consular agent.10 3 Essentially, when a consular agent takes
evidence in the territory of another contracting state from a
national of a state other than the one he represents, a competent
authority named by the state in which he exercises his functions
must give permission and the consular agent must comply with
the conditions set by the authority.10 4 States may waive the prior
permission requirement. 10 5
Article 18 permits a state to declare that an authorized
diplomatic office, consular agent, or commissioner may apply to a
competent authority for help in compelling evidence.' 0 6 It is
unlikely, however, that an unwilling witness will be compelled to
testify in any state other than one of the four, including the
United States and the United Kingdom, which have made such a
declaration under Article 18.107 In addition, a state making such
a declaration may specify any additional conditions it deems
08
necessary.'
3. General Provisions
Chapter III of the Convention consists of several general
clauses. One such clause has proven to be one of the more
significant and controversial clauses in the Convention.' 0 9 Article
23, which addresses pre-trial discovery, provides that a signatory
state may declare that it will not accept letters of request for "the
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known
in Common Law countries." 1 10 Only documents, however, are
within the purview of Article 23, and oral depositions are not."'
The differences between U.S. and British discovery practices

103. Id. Ch. I, art. 16, at 2564-65.
104.
Id. Ch. II, art. 16(a)-(b), at 2564-65.
105.
Id. Ch. II, art. 16, at 2564-65.
106.
Id. Ch. II, art. 18, at 2566.
107.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 103. Besides the United States and the
United Kingdom, only Czechoslovakia and Italy have made such declarations. Id.
See also Comment, The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and MandatoryProceduresfor
Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1984).
108.
Convention, supra note 63, Ch. II, art. 19, at 2566. These additional
conditions may regard the time and place in which evidence will be obtained. Id.
109.
See MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 97-101 (discussing concerns and
reservations about Article 28).
110.
Id. at Ch. III, art. 23, at 2568. See also Comment, supra note 83, at
1468-69.
111.
Convention, supranote 63, Ch. Il, art. 23, at 2568. See also MCCLEAN,
supra note 39, at 98. One commentator has noted that reservations made under
Article 23 cannot extend the scope of the Convention past Article 1. See id.
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12
motivated the pre-trial discovery exclusion of the Convention.'
A greater understanding of the purpose of Article 23 comes from a
close examination of the policy arguments behind the drafting of
3
the Convention."

B. The Policy Behind the Hague Convention: Shedding
Light on the Intended Role of the Convention
in ExtraterritorialDiscovery
Great differences exist between the way discovery is
conducted around the world. These differences, quite expectedly,
lead to disputes.
As disputes arose in the international
community when states sought to give effect to their discovery
procedure on foreign litigants, it was clear that an international
solution was needed. The result was the Convention, which took
effect in 1972.114 A significant factor in the Convention was the
policy concerns of the signatory nations." s Nations are primarily
concerned with their sovereignty and the preservation of their
methods of discovery." 6 The most pressing concern shared by
European common law jurisdictions and civil law jurisdictions
was the liberal nature of U.S. discovery procedure, and more
7
specifically the U.S. practice of pretrial discovery."
To understand the policy concerns behind the Convention, it
is important to first examine the purpose and intent of the
Convention. The purpose of the Convention, as seen by Phillip W.
Amram, a U.S. representative involved with drafting the
Convention, was to
improve the existing system of Letters of Request; (2) enlarge the
devices for the taling of evidence by increasing the powers of
consuls and by introducing in the civil law world, on a limited
basis, the concept of the commissions; and (3) preserve all the more
favorable and less restrictive practices arising from internal law,
internal rules of procedure, and bilateral or multilateral
conventions.118

112. See Oxman, supra note 57, at 771 (explaining that Article 23 was
drafted in response to diverging American and British discovery practices).
113. See discussion infra Part III.B.
114. McClean, supra note 63, at 22.
115. See id. at 23-25 (discussing the history and purpose of the
Convention).
116. See id. at 25 (stating that "[t]he Convention attempted to accommodate
discovery "American style" to a limited extent, and at the same time preserve civil
law, judicial sovereignty and evidence gathering").
117.
Guy Miller Struve, Discovery from Foreign Parties in Civil Cases Before
U.S. Courts, 16 INT'LL. & POLY' 1101, 1107 (1984).
118. See McClean, supra, note 63, at 23 (citing Amram, the Proposed
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651, 652 (1969)).

2000]

EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERYREQUESTS

1239

The signatory states sought to reach a compromise over the
conflicting discovery systems in negotiating the Convention.1 1 9
The most serious conflict in legal systems was clearly between the
United States and civil law systems in Europe. 120
1. Did the Parties Intend for the Hague Convention to be the
Exclusive Means for Obtaining Evidence Abroad?
The Convention caused the least disruption to the U.S. legal
system. 12 '
The Convention adhered to the principles of the
United States' international judicial assistance policy.' 2 2 Civil
law countries, in contrast, experienced a divergence from their
accepted practices with the adoption of the Convention. 123 The
concessions made by civil law countries and other states did not
seem to be met by reciprocal concession on the part of the United
States. 124 The intentions of the parties to the Convention raises
questions regarding the role it was designed to play in
extraterritorial discovery. The issue as to whether the Convention
is the exclusive means for obtaining evidence abroad requires
some examination of how it was drafted. 125 The Convention does
not have an express exclusivity provision.126 The Hague Service
Convention, on the other hand, does include such a provision.12 7
Therefore, one may conclude that if the parties to the Convention
intended such an interpretation they would have included an
express provision.' 28 Some argue that the United States clearly
never intended to prohibit extraterritorial discovery not
conforming to Convention procedures.12 9

119.
See id. at 24.
120.
See id.
121.
See id.
122.
See id.
123.
See id.
Although most countries experienced change in their
international judicial assistance policy, it was civil law countries that experienced
the most change. See id.
124.
See Oxman, supra note 57, at 760. Bernard Oxman points out that "if
the convention does not restrict unilateral extraterritorial discovery methods, then
the civil law countries received no meaningful quid pro quo for their concessions to
the United States under the convention." Id. Oxman further explains that
"consideration" is not required in international treaty law. Id.
125.
See id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. See also MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 47-50 (discussing the Hague
Service Convention). The Hague Service Convention sought to establish a system
for service of process abroad. Id.
128.
See id. Though the Convention does not expressly prohibit the taking
of evidence abroad outside convention procedures, some countries will only permit
the taking of evidence according to the convention as a matter of international
law. See id.
129.
Id.
Oxman argues that the intent of the United States is made
manifest by the history of extraterritorial discovery commonly practiced by U.S.

1240

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

fVol. 33:1223

Concerns about the United States' lack of concessions feed
the debate over the exclusivity of the Convention. 130 If the
Convention was not intended to be exclusive, then it appears that
the United States got all the advantages.' 3 ' Foreigners seeking
evidence located in the United States were not likely to see a
change in U.S. policy because it was not conditioned on
reciprocity. 13 2
Foreign countries, though not agreeing to
reciprocity in the Convention, did agree to more liberal
procedures for extraterritorial discovery.' 3 3
The different
discovery procedures of the international community demanded
compromise to establish uniform procedures. 13 4 The broad
discovery procedures of the United States were viewed as
threatening by other nations with more conservative
approaches. 1 35 The
Convention is understood as representing
36
that compromise.'
2. Article 23: The Problem of Pre-Trial Discovery
In establishing an acceptable compromise, provisions were
included in the Convention to protect the sovereignty of signatory
states and preserve their procedures. 13 7 One such provision was
the Article 23 exclusion of pre-trial discovery of documents. 138
The United Kingdom was the force behind the inclusion of Article
23 in the Hague Evidence Convention.' 3 9 The British were very
40
concerned about the United States' liberal discovery practices.'
The United Kingdom's own practice of limiting discovery to
documents clearly influenced their position on Article 23 of the
Convention.141

courts. Id. Furthermore, Oxman states that he is unaware of any intent to
prohibit the practice by American negotiators, the Department of State, or
Congress. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 761.
133. Id. The liberal procedures of U.S. discovery clearly would never have
been adopted by foreign countries. Efforts were made, however, on the part of
civil law countries to adopt common law procedures. Id.
134. See id.
135. See Comment, supranote 107, at 1465.
136. Id.
137.
See Oxman, supra note 57, at 770-7 1.
138.
See id. at 771.
139. Id. See also Collins, infra note 140, at 29.
140. Lawrence Collins, Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to ObtainingEvidence
in Englandfor Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INTL LAw. 27, 27 (1979).
Collins observed that the divergence of U.S. discovery procedure from its English
origins is appalling to the English. Id.
141.
See id. at 27-28.
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The United Kingdom was particularly concerned with the
U.S. practice of obtaining information not necessarily relevant to
the case but that might lead to the discovery of relevant
information to be admitted at trial. 14 2 The English are hostile to
this "fishing expedition" practice, which they view as an excessive
expansion of the discovery process. 143 In the United States,
Federal Rule 26(b)(1) only requires that information sought
during discovery appear "reasonably calculated to lead to the
14 4
discovery of admissible evidence."
The United Kingdom, in contrast, will only permit the
14 5
discovery of evidence that will actually be admissible at trial.
Therefore, the United Kingdom registered a reservation that it
would not execute letters of request for pre-trial discovery of
documents. 14 6 The United Kingdom explained in its reservation
that such letters of request include any which require
a person: a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to
which the Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his
possession, custody or power; or b) to produce any documents
appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his
14 7
possession, custody or power.

The reservation does not prohibit courts from executing letters of
request for pre-trial discovery of specific documents. 148 As a
result of the U.K. declaration, at least one commentator has
concluded that the negotiators of the provision misunderstood the
true objection to U.S. pre-trial discovery. 14 9 Forms of discovery
other than documents are outside the scope of Article 23.150
Therefore, it is arguable that those other forms of discovery, such
as oral depositions, were the true source of British discontent,

142.
Id. at 31.
143.
See Oxman, supra note 57, at 773 (describing the British courts'
objections to U.S. discovery procedures). As well, a concern about the United
States' use of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of its anti-trust and
anti-Communist trade policies influenced Britain's stance. Id. at 771.
144.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), supra note 7. See also discussion supra
pp. 5-6.
145.
See MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 99 (discussing Lord Diplock's
interpretation of the Evidence Act of 1975 to permit only the discovery of evidence
that would be admissible at trial).
146.
Collins, supranote 140, at 29 (noting the United Kingdom's reservation
to Article 23 that it would not execute letters of request for the purpose of
obtaining pre-trial discovery).
147
Id.
148
See Comment, supra note 107, at 1468, n. 35.
149.
Collins, supra note 141, at 30.
Collins commented that "the
negotiators of Article 23 did not clearly understand what the real objection to
American pre-tria discovery was, since they were clearly influenced by the
modem English use of the expression discovery, namely the discovery of
documents." Id.
150.
MCCLEAN, supranote 39, at 98.
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and the reason for the United Kingdom's including a definition of
pre-trial discovery of documents in its reservation.' 5 '
The different meaning and approaches to discovery was a
source of disagreement.15 2 The term "pre-trial discovery" was
also problematic because it was misunderstood by civil law states
to mean that evidence was collected prior to bringing a cause of
53
action.1
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL DIscovERY REQUESTS AND THE
PROBLEMS OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOR USE IN LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Conflicts can arise when American based litigation requires

evidence from the United Kingdom. This is primarily due to the
different concepts of discovery in the two nations.' 54
As
previously noted, there was hostility on the part of the United
Kingdom towards the U.S. approach to discovery.' 5 5 Litigators
may encounter great difficulty in obtaining evidence in the United
Kingdom for use in the United States.' 56 U.S. methods of
discovery are not well-received abroad and quite often are rejected
by foreign jurisdictions. 1 5 7 It is not well settled as to what
methods a U.S. court should employ when dealing with the
problem of obtaining evidence from abroad.
Some argue that the discovery methods of the state from
which the evidence is sought should be applied, rather than the
requesting state's methods.' 5 8 U.S. courts, however, are partial
to their own methods of discovery and wish to enforce them

whenever possible in extraterritorial requests.

59

There are

different international guides to resolving extraterritorial
discovery disputes, such as the Convention and the Restatement
160
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law; however, none are binding.

151.
See id. at 61.
152. Oxman, supranote 57, at 772-73.
153. Id. at 773-74. It is clear that such an interpretation would lead a civil
law jurisdiction to believe that evidence could be obtained for the purpose of trying
to decide whether one could bring litigation. See id. Undoubtedly such confusion
could lead to great conflict.
154. See discussion supraPart II.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See NEWMAN & ZASLOWSKY, supranote 55, at 138.
158. See generally Oxman, supra note 57, at 733 for a discussion of which
method of discovery should be employed when evidence is sought abroad for use
in litigation in the United States.
159. Id. at 734-35.
160. See Daniela Levarda, Note, A Comparative Study of U.S. and British
Approaches to Discovery Conflicts: Achieving a Uniform System of Extraterritorial
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No tribunal exists for resolving extraterritorial discovery
161
disputes.
The United States often practices broad extraterritorial
discovery in keeping with the Federal Rules. 16 2 In addition to the
Federal Rules, courts in the United States often rely on the
Restatement. 16 3 Courts also consider good faith and comity,
while balancing the need for disclosure with confidentiality
concerns of foreign states. 16 4 All of these approaches aid U.S.
courts in their endeavor to formulate an approach to
extraterritorial discovery that satisfies both U.S. discovery
and the interests and concerns of foreign
procedure
165
sovereignties.
Once the Convention was in place, the next step was for each
country to implement it. 1 6 6 The differences between the U.S. and
British attitudes toward extraterritorial discovery became even
167
more pronounced.
A. The U.S. Approach to ExtraterritorialDiscovery
and Implementing the Hague Convention
The U.S. approach to extraterritorial discovery incorporates a
combination of international legal doctrines and guides, including
and the
the Convention, the Federal Rules, comity,
The United States' extraterritorial discovery
Restatement.' 6 8
jurisprudence has changed over time. Whether the United States
should exercise greater power over extraterritorial discovery or
greater deference to foreign sovereignty is an often debated
169
topic.
1. The U.S. Approach to Extraterritorial Discovery Employing
Comity and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States
The Restatement, though not binding, is a valuable source of
guidance for U.S. courts with regard to extraterritorial discovery

Discovery, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1340, 1357 (1995). Levarda proposes for a
multinational review panel be established to resolve extraterritorial discovery
disputes. See generally id.
See id. at 1340-43.
161.
162. Id. at 1353.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 1354.
165.
See id.
166.
See id. at 1373.
See id. at 1377.
167.
Id. at 1353-54.
168.
169.
See id. at 1356.
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disputes. 170 The Restatement takes the position that it is within
a U.S. court's jurisdiction to apply and enforce U.S. procedure
upon foreign litigants.171 Specifically, Section 402 addresses the
jurisdiction a state has to prescribe law with respect to foreign
nationals outside its territory. 17 2 When the conduct of foreign
nationals has effect in the United States, then U.S. courts have
173
jurisdiction over that person.
Section 402 is subject to Section 403, which imposes a
reasonableness requirement
on extraterritorial
discovery
conducted by U.S. courts. 174 Determining reasonableness is a
matter of examining several factors listed in Section 403,
including: the effect an activity has upon the territory; nationality,
residence, or economic connections; character of the activity and
the importance and general acceptance of the regulation; the
regulation's impact on justified expectations; international
political, legal or economic significance of the regulation;
international traditions; the interests of another state; and
potential conflict with foreign regulation. 175 These factors guide a
court in determining the extent to which U.S. procedure and
17 6
jurisdiction will be extended in extraterritorial disputes.

170. Id. at 1357.
171. Id. at 1357-58.
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987).
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within it territory;
(2) the activities, interests status, or relations of its nationals outside
as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of
other state interests.
Id.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. § 403(1).

Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.
Id.
175.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2) (1997).

176.

See COLLINS, supranote 140, at 18-19 for a discussion of § 403(2).
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Nonetheless, the Restatement still permits- U.S. courts to
In the
exercise their jurisdiction and power expansively. 17 7
interest of comity, Section 442(c) urges the consideration of
several factors in ordering discovery abroad. 178 These factors are:
the importance to . . . the litigation of the documents or other
information requested; the degree of specificity of the request;
whether the information originated in the United States; the
availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
the extent to which non-compliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the state
17 9
where the information is located.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Societe Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale v. United States District Court,'8 0 articulated the
concerns behind a comity approach and referred to the
Restatement.' 8 ' Though the Restatement supports broad power
in U.S. courts in extraterritorial discovery, it also recognizes the
need for balance.' 8 2 The interest of another state's sovereignty
83
must be weighed against the U.S. interest in seeking evidence.'
The factors set out in Section 442 take account of this need for
balance against the backdrop of the United States' own
interests.184 Such interests include U.S. methods of discovery
and trial procedure.' 8 5 For example, the Federal Rules allow for
8 6
the discovery of evidence that is not admissible at trial.'
Although the practice is strongly criticized by foreign states,
Section 442 of the Restatement does not restrict a U.S. court from
ordering the disclosure of evidence not admissible at trial.18 7 The
overall approach of the Restatement takes into account the need
for comity, while still focusing on its primary goal of allowing for
88
the application of U.S. procedural rules on foreign litigants.'

177.
See RESTATEMENT, supranote 175, § 442.
178. Id. § 442(1)(c).
179. Id. § 442(I)(c).
180. Societe Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District
Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
181.
Id. at 544.
182.
See id at 544 n.28 (discussing comity analysis and § 431 of the
tentative draft of the Restatement which later became § 442).
183.
Id. at 543-44.
184.
COLLINS, supra note 140, at 193-94.
185.
See id. at 193-96 (discussing § 442 of the Restatement).
186.
See FED. R. CIV. P., supranote 7. See also discussion supra pp. 9-10.
187.
See Convention, supranote 137, § 442 cmt. a.
188. Id.

1246

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 33:1223

2. The California Cases: The U.S. Approach to Extraterritorial
Discovery Before Adrospatiale

U.S. courts applied the principles of the Convention as a first
resort in international discovery disputes. Prior to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Arospatiale,this approach was deeply rooted
in international comity.18 9 This section of the note will examine
some notable California cases 90 from the 1970s and early 1980s
which applied the comity approach.
These cases are good
examples of the U.S. approach to extraterritorial discovery prior
to the Arospatiale decision. 19 1 Specifically, they examine the
competing interests of the United States and foreign nations, as
well as the competing interests of domestic and foreign
92
litigants.1
In 1973, the California Court of Appeals, in Volkswagenwerk
A. G. v. SuperiorCourt of Sacramento County, considered the issue

of whether a California court had jurisdiction over persons in
Germany.19 3 The court determined that such jurisdiction did not
follow simply because the court had jurisdiction over the German
defendant. 19 4 The court asserted that courts "ordering discovery
abroad must conform to the channels and procedures established
by the host nation."195 As the court recognized, support for this
assertion can be found in comity.19 6 The court was aware that
there may be times when a defendant will attempt to "hide behind
diplomatic walls;" however, the present case did not evidence
"evasiveness and recalcitrance" on the part of the defendant.19 7
The plaintiffs were ordered to employ letters rogatory as a first
resort to obtaining evidence, as the court saw no reason to
produce "friction" between the United States and Germany with
98
invasive discovery orders.'

189. See MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 108 (explaining that the comity
approach advocates judicial self-restraint).
190. See Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County,
109 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court of
Almeda County, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Pierburg GmbH & Co.
Superior Court of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See 109 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
194. Id. at 221.
195. Id.
196. Id. (stating that the "limitation may rest on any one of several
theories-comity, curtailed discretion or implied statutory qualification").
197. Id. at 222.
198. Id. The court observed that the case was one of first impression in
California and that the decision expressed "a policy of avoiding international
discovery methods productive of friction with the procedures of host nations." Id.
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The next significant case decided by the California Court of
Appeals was Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Superior Court of Alameda
County' 9 9 in 1981. The case concerned whether, in light of the
Convention, a California court could order discovery of evidence
in Germany.2 0 0 The German defendant asserted that the order
infringed upon German sovereignty and that the discovery
requests did not meet German specificity requirements designed
to protect defendants from "abuse, oppression, or other
injustice."2 0
Understanding the need to balance German
interests with the interests of U.S. litigants, the court concluded
20 2
that first resort should be to the procedures of the Convention.
The court observed that the Convention procedure of letters of
request was broader than the previously available letters
rogatory. 20 3 The court was careful to protect German sovereignty
and rejected the claimants proposed mechanism for obtaining
evidence. 20 4
Therefore, the Convention provided the guiding
principles for answering international discovery questions
presented to the California courts.
Another California case, Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles,2 0s
also required first resort to the
Convention procedures. 20 6 The court stated that "California's
interest in avoiding violations of international treaties [was]
clearly a rational basis for requiring California litigants to comply
with the Convention."20 7
The court refused to accept the
plaintiffs' argument that the interrogatories could be answered in
the United States.2 0 8 Rather, the court determined that the
interrogatories sought information located and known to persons
in West Germany.2 0 9 As the Court saw it, the plaintiffs' request
2 10
would undermine and destroy the intent of the Convention.
Therefore, the Pierburg court followed and applied precedent,

199.

176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

200.

Id.

201.
Id. at 880-81.
202.
Id. at 858.
203.
Id. at 880.
204.
Id. at 884-85. The court rejected the claimants' argument that the
investigative "Noted Verbales" were consistent with the Convention. Id. at 882. In
fact, the court declared that the method rooted in postwar allied occupation of
Germany "would violate West German judicial sovereignty." Id. at 883.
205.
186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
206.
Id. This case concerned a West German corporation involved in a
personal injury products liability action in the United States. Id.
207.
Id. at 882.
208.
Id. at 881.

209.

Id.

210.

Id.
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first resort to the Convention
holding that the plaintiffs must
211
procedures to obtain discovery.
3. Extraterritorial Discovery After Societe NationaleIndustrielle
Adrospatiale v. United States District Courtfor Iowa
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States
District Court for Iowa,2 12 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
2 13
The decision
comity approach of first resort to the Convention.
significantly changed the U.S. approach to extraterritorial
2 14
In support for the
discovery and sparked international debate.
holding, the Court explained that requiring first resort to the
Convention could be very time consuming and expensive for
The Court expressed concern that Convention
litigants. 2 1S
procedures may not provide all needed evidence, whereas the
2 16
Federal Rules could.
The petitioners argued that the Convention procedures were
the only means by which discovery could be conducted in France,
2 17
and that any other means would violate French sovereignty.
The Court stated that such an intention, if true, would have been
2 18
Rather,
explicitly stated in the Convention, which it was not.
the Court advocated a case-by-case approach for determining
whether certain procedures may be intrusive, considering the
2 19
reasonableness of the request and the interests of the parties.
The Court, however, recognized the need for fairness to foreign
litigants and urged that U.S. courts should "exercise special
2 20
vigilance to protect foreign litigants."

211. Id.at883.
212. 488 U.S. 522 (1987).
213. Id. at 512, 544. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' argument
that if a foreign court denies discovery after first resort to the Convention, a
discovery order from a U.S. court would be viewed as "the greatest insult" to the
foreign court's sovereignty. Id. at 542.
214. See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1456, 1492 (1991) (discussing the implication of the Adrospatiale case on
extraterritorial discovery.
215. Adrospatiale,488 U.S. at 542.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 543.
218. Id.
Id. at 545-546. The court believed that the trial court would possess
219.
the knowledge to determine what was the most reasonable approach considering
all the facts and factors of the case. Id. at 546.
220. Id. The Court did continue to urge that U.S. courts carefully supervise
extraterritorial discovery to prevent abuses. Id. In addition, the Court recognized
that an interest in comity requires courts to consider any particular burdens
foreign litigants may face as well as the sovereign interests of their state. Id.
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Conversely, the dissent, led by Justice Blackmun, concluded
that comity required first resort to the Convention. 2 2 1 The
dissent believed that conflicts between U.S. discovery procedures
and foreign discovery procedures could be avoided by using the
Justice Blackmun criticized the
Convention procedures. 22 2
majority opinion for ignoring the "policies established by the
political branches when they negotiated and ratified" the
Furthermore, Justice Blackmnun argued that
Convention. 22 3
rather than
international comity demands more "definite rules"
22 4
the case-by-case approach adopted by the majority.
The Agrospatiale case resulted in debate and confusion
regarding the role of the Convention in the United States
approach to extraterritorial discovery. 2 25 The decision did not
resolve the debate over comity analysis. 22 6 Since the decision,
there has been concern in developing an analytical framework for
U.S. courts to apply when dealing with international discovery
7
issues. 2 2
B. The BritishApproach to ExtraterritorialDiscovery
Requests and Implementing the Hague Convention
The United Kingdom's distaste for the United States' methods
of discovery is no where more apparent than in its
implementation of the Convention and its response to U.S.
discovery request in the United Kingdom.

221.
Id. at 548-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 548.
223. Id. at 551.
224.
Id. at 554. Justice Blackmun stressed that comity is "a principle under
which judicial decisions reflect the systematic value of reciprocal tolerance and
goodwill." Id. at 555 (citing Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a
Crossroads:An Intersection Between Public and InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L

L. 280, 281-85 (1982)).
225.
See Burbank, supra note 214, at 1492-96 (discussing and critiquing
the Adrospatiale case).
226.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 117 (observing that although the Court
rejected first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention, the decision did not
determine the nature of comity analysis).
For a complete discussion of Adrospatiale and a suggestion for an
227.
analytical framework see David J. Gerber, International Discovery After
Adrospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT'L. L. 521

(1988).
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1. The Evidence Act of 1975
It was necessary for the United Kingdom to pass legislation in
order to implement the Convention. 2 28 The Evidence (Proceedings
in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 (Evidence Act) is the
legislation that regulates the United Kingdom's application of the
Convention to extraterritorial discovery requests. 2 2 9 Despite the
fact that the Convention is never mentioned in the Evidence Act,
it allowed the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention.2 3 0 As one
commentator noted, the Evidence Act bears a resemblance to the
23
Convention. '
The Evidence Act governs the power of a court in the United
Kingdom to execute a foreign request for discovery in the United
Kingdom.2 3 2 Section 2 allows the court to grant requests for the
examination of witnesses, the production of documents, the
inspection of property, the taking of samples of or conducting
experiments on property, and the medical examination of any
person.2 3 3
The Section, however, prohibits the court from
granting requests for a person "to state what documents relevant
to the proceedings to which the application for the order relates
are or have been in his possession, custody or power," or to
produce any such documents.2 3 4
Section 2(4) is almost
indistinguishable from the language of the United Kingdom's
23 5
reservation to Article 3 of the Convention.
2. The Specificity Requirement and the Westinghouse Case: A
significant Barrier to Obtaining Evidence in the United Kingdom
The most significant interpretation of the Evidence Act
occurred in 1978 in the case of Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.2 3 6 In this case the House of Lords considered
whether .certain letters rogatory ought to be given effect under the

228.
See Collins, supra note 140, at 30 (explaining that legislation was
needed to implement the Convention since international conventions do not
directly have effect in English law.)
229.
Id.
230.
MCCLEAN, supra note 39, at 105.
231.
Levarda, supra note 160, at 1380. The resemblance is particularly
noticeable with respect to measures available to compel disclosure. Id.
232.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, Sec. 2 (1975)

(Eng.).
233.
234.
235.

Id. at Sec. 2(2).
Id. at Sec. 2(4).
See LAWRENCE COLLINS, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery:

A Serious Misunderstanding?, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
CONFLICT OF LAWS 289, 305 (1994).

236.

[1978] A.C. 547.

AND THE
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Evidence Act. 2 37 In the decision the court criticized the U.S.
discovery procedures. 2 38 Particularly, the court commented on
how U.S. discovery had diverged from that of the United Kingdom,
239
and been expanded greatly in the United States.
The court was most concerned with the lack of specificity
required in U.S. extraterritorial discovery. 2 4 ° The U.S. practice of
allowing discovery of any information that might lead to
admissible evidence stands in severe contrast to the English
requirement that evidence can only be discovered if it is in fact
admissible at trial. 2 4 1 The court stated that the Evidence Act was
drafted with a distinction between immediate relevant material,
"direct" material, and "indirect" material. 2 42 The court found
support in the Article 23 of the Convention, which provided that a
signatory state could reject a letter of request for pre-trial
discovery. 2 4 3 The Evidence Act contained such a reservation on
the part of the United Kingdom. 2 " The court asserted that the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom is paramount. 24 S The court,
however, observed that the interests of the United States must be
weighed in a decision regarding whether to give effect to a letter
24
rogatory. 6

V. OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR
USE IN INDUSTRY-WIDE TORT LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

A

NEW CHALLENGE

A new kind of litigation is on the rise in the United States.
When Congress fails to act in areas such as tobacco regulation,
the people increasingly look to the judiciary to accomplish the
task.2 47
Tobacco litigation is the type of industry-wide tort

237.
Id. at 606.
238.
Id. at 616 (drawing specific attention to U.S. policy in anti-trust
legislation).
239. Id. at 608 (quoting Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp. 11956] 1
Q.B. 618, 643-44).
240. Id. at 610.
241.
See discussion supraParts II.A., II.B.
242.
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., supranote 98, at 608.
243.
Id.
244.
See Collins, supranote 140, at 29-30 (discussing the United Kingdom's
reservations).
245.
Rio 7nto Zinc Corp., supranote 98, at 616.
246.
Id.
247.
See Graham E. Kelder & Richard A. Daynard, Symposium: The Role of
Litigationin the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POLY
REV. 63, 63-64 (1997). The authors focus on the failure of other conventional
means of regulation, such as legislation and administrative regulation, and the
role litigation has come to fill in the regulation of tobacco products. Id. One
reason offered by the authors for the failure of traditional regulatory measures is
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litigation based on a theory of an industry wide conspiracy to
conceal information from the public about the dangers of a
product. 2 48
When litigation is based on the theory that an
industry
concealed
information,
obtaining
key
industry
information is central to proving one's case. 2 4 9 Unfortunately,
without whistle-blowers it can be difficult to know what to look
for. Sorting though vast amounts of industry files may be the
only option. Therein lies the problem.
A. Learning a Lesson from Tobacco Litigation

1. The Role of Discovery in U.S. Tobacco Litigation
Discovery played an important role in the success of tobacco
litigation in the United States. 25 0
Without the expansive
disclosure of damaging industry documents, the battle against
the tobacco industry may never have been won.2 s 1 The theory
that the tobacco industry conspired to conceal information from
the public about the health hazards of smoking depended heavily
upon uncovering industry documents that revealed such a
"smoking gun. 2 S2 Fortunately, industry insiders turned whistleblowers made many documents available and aided in the
process of uncovering industry documents.2 5 3 These documents
through the discovery process showed that the tobacco
companies knew about the addictive qualities of nicotine and the
cancer causing properties of smoking, yet decided to conceal that
25 4
information from the public.

the significant political power the tobacco industry exercises on the legislature.
Id. at 63.
248.
See id. at 72 (discussing the theory behind the third wave of tobacco
litigation).
249. The role of full discovery in industry-wide tort litigation is made
manifest in a discussion of tobacco litigation. See discussion infra Part V.A. 1.
250. See Ron Scherer, A Second Wind in Tobacco Fight, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 2, 1997, at 7 (stating that "[t]he discovery process was critical to
getting the tobacco industry to the bargaining table in the US").
251. Id.
252. Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party
Liability and Claimsfor Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 497, 509-10 (1997)
(explaining that plaintiffs sought discovery of industry documents that would
reveal that the tobacco industry concealed that nicotine was addictive to promote
addiction).
253. See Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big
Tobacco is Fightingfor Its Life Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with
Mounting Evidence, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 120 (1997). One anonymous source
who disclosed thousands of pages of information was known as "Mr. Butts." Id.
254. Id. at 120-21.
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The state of Minnesota's lawsuit against the tobacco industry
provides the best forum for looking at the critical role discovery
played. 25 5 Minnesota's tobacco litigation provided the greatest
number of industry documents in the United States by
successfully piercing the tobacco industry's barriers to obtaining
information.2 5 6 The result of Minnesota's discovery process was
the discovery of tens of millions of pages of industry
documents. 25 7 Minnesota experienced a great deal of resistance
on the part of the tobacco industry in obtaining the
2s s
documents.
One examination of document discovery in Minnesota
tobacco litigation looks at the strategies used by the tobacco
industry to avoid disclosure.2 5 9 The tobacco industry claimed it
did not understand the meanings of certain words in the
discovery requests.2 6 0
The tobacco industry lawyers indexed
industry documents and tried to avoid disclosure of the indices by
claiming work product.2 6 1 The Minnesota attorneys spent sixteen
months in litigation in order to obtain these indices which were
an important guide to obtaining and finding industry
documents.2 6 2 Eventually the court ordered the tobacco industry
to produce the indices which proved to be invaluable to
Minnesota's case. 2 6 3 The industry waged such a vigorous battle
in an attempt to avoid discovery because the plaintiffs case
required proving that a conspiracy existed.
The damaging
industry documents demonstrated this conspiracy by showing the
industry's knowledge of the health hazards of smoking.2 6 4

255.
For an examination of Minnesota tobacco litigation and discovery, see
Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota
Tobacco Litigation,25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477 (1999); see generally Symposium,
Tobacco Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 373 (1999); see also Field, supra note 253, at 119-20.
256.
See Ciresi, supra note 255, at 479.
257.
Id. at 489. In fact, Brown & Williamson produced more than four
million pages of documents, as opposed to the 1,350 pages disclosed prior to
1994; Philip Morris produced six million pages compared with 140,000; and BAT
produced several million pages when it had disclosed nothing prior to the
Minnesota case. Id. The documents are now housed in document depositories in
Minnesota and England. Id.
258. Id.
259.
See generally id.
260.
Id. at 490.
261.
Id. at 490-91.
262.
Id. at 490.
263.
Id. at 493-94.
264.
Id. at 500.
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a. In an Age of Globalization, Big Tobacco Finds a New Trick
The most startling tactic used by the tobacco industry to
avoid discovery of damaging industry documents in the tobacco
litigation was to send those documents overseas and deny they
existed. 2 65 This tactic had great implications for extraterritorial
discovery.
It made obvious a loophole in the extraterritorial
discovery process. 2 6 6 The intent of any nation's extraterritorial
discovery policy may be to protect its nationals from unfair
discovery that is inconsistent with its own procedures, but it
surely is not to provide international corporations with a way to
hide evidence.
By shipping evidence to branches abroad, a
corporation can considerably frustrate the discovery process.
When evidence is located abroad it becomes more costly and
timely to obtain. Extreme cost and time can discourage a plaintiff
from bringing suit, a result any potential defendant would like.
The
tobacco
industry
discovered
and
preemptively
implemented this technique. 26 7
Philip Morris conducted its
research on the health effects of smoking in Europe. 2 68 Brown &
overseas. 2 69
research
its
conducted
also
Williamson
Furthermore, the company sent its domestic research documents
abroad and kept no records of them in an attempt to keep the
documents hidden. 270
Evidence that the industry sent
documents abroad surfaced in the Minnesota litigation. 2 7 1 The

265. See Ciresi, supranote 255, at 493-94.
266. Id. at 490.
267. See infra notes 270 and 271 and accompanying text.
268. Id. at 551-552. The tobacco industry had agreed not to conduct inhouse research. Id. at 551. Philip Morris was dissatisfied with the agreement,
however, and located a facility in Europe that it purchased to conduct research.
Id. at 552. According to at least one article, records and interviews show that
tobacco lawyers prepared for lawsuits by terminating research projects or moving
them abroad where it would be more difficult to reach their details with a
subpoena. Myron Levin, Years of Immunity and Arrogance Up In Smoke, L.A.
TIMES, May 10, 1998 at Dl, LEXIS, Nexis Library, L.A. TIMES File.
269. See Field, Comment, supranote 253, at 121 n. 238.
270. See id. at 121-22. The company had maintained that the hidden
documents did not exist. Id.
271. See Kristen Gartman Rogers, Note, 'Mad Plaintiff Disease?" Tobacco
Litigation and the BritishDebate Over Adoption of U.S.-Style Tort Litigation Methods,
27 GA. J. INTL &.COMP. L. 199, 214 (citing Barry Meier, Minnesota Official Invites
CongressionalScrutiny of Tobacco Industry Files, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1997, at
A10). At a symposium on the Florida tobacco litigation, one attorney agreed that
the tobacco companies sent documents to England because they could not be
reached with a subpoena there. Symposium, Transcript of the Florida Tobacco
Litigation Symposium-Fact, Law, Policy, and Significance, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
737, 786 (1998). Professor Stemlight, a civil procedure and alternative dispute
resolution expert at Florida State University College of Law, said regarding the
tobacco industry's sending documents abroad, "[t]hat's basically because you
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tobacco companies appear to have been aware of the benefits of
sending evidence that plaintiffs would want abroad. 2 7 2 Rather
than destroy the evidence, they sent documents abroad and
2 73
denied their existence.
b. Problems with the United Kingdom's Specificity Requirement:
Minnesota v. Philip MorrisInc.
The tobacco litigation in Minnesota encountered the British
justice system and the specificity requirement when plaintiffs
sought testimony from witnesses located in England. 27 4 The
Honorable Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick, the Minnesota District Court
judge for the trial, sent a letter of request to the English court to
conduct videotaped testimony of four witnesses located in
England. 2 75 The Court of Appeals denied the request because the
questions were topics of "unlimited generality." 2 76 In his opinion,
Lord Wolf emphasized the differences between U.S. and British
discovery, including the American tradition of oral discovery
which does not exist in the United Kingdom. 2 77 The Lord also
pointed out that much wider "non party" discovery is allowed in
the United States, which is impermissible in the United
2 78
Kingdom.
Importantly, the Lord emphasized the United Kingdom's
aversion to "fishing expeditions." 2 79 The opinion cites to a history
of cases in the United Kingdom where the court expressed it
would not grant letters of request that appear to be of a "fishing"
nature.2 8 0 Although the Lord determined that the testimony was
sought for trial, within the scope of the Evidence Act, he
concluded that there was also an alternative purpose for the

couldn't reach them with a subpoena over in England?" Id. To that Mr. Berly, an
attorney involved with suing the tobacco industry, responded, "[e]xactly, exactly."
Id.
Furthermore, the transcript of the symposium contained an even more
intriguing exchange. Professor Sternlight asked Mr. Berly, "[w]hy would they
rather send them over there instead of bum them or shred them or whatever?" Id.
Mr. Berly responded, "[w]hy did Nixon keep his tapes? I don't know." Id. Perhaps
the reason the tobacco industry did not destroy the documents was the threat of
penalties for doing so. Sending them abroad is not against the law.
272.
Id.
273.
Id.
274.
Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., 1997 WL 1105492 (Eng. C.A.).
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id. Particularly the Lord noted that the United Kingdom regards oral
discovery as unnecessarily costly and complex. Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
280.
Id.
The opinion more notably cites to In Re States of Norway's
Application (No. 1), [1987] QB 433, the Westinghouse case, and Radio Corp. v.
Rauland Corp., 11956] 1 QB 618. Id.
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testimony: to indirectly obtain information that would lead to
further evidence, ultimately afishing." 28 1 The Lord ordered that
the questions be redrafted so that they could meet the British
court's requirements. 28 2 The Lord declined to undertake the task
of redrafting the questions. 28 3 This decision came down three
284
months after the requested testimony was desired.
2. The United Kingdom Imports the Tobacco Lawsuit: What
Happened?
After witnessing the success of tobacco litigation in the
United States, plaintiffs in the United Kingdom decided to bring
suit there.2 8
The first lawsuit against the tobacco industry in
the United Kingdom was filed in 1996.286 Changes in the British
legal system, such as the institution of the conditional fee in
1995, finally made tobacco litigation possible in the United
Kingdom. 28 7
According to one commentator, the Cipollone v.
Liggett Group2 8 8 decision in the U.S. Supreme Court gave rise to
British tobacco litigation for at least two reasons.2 8 9 The Third
Circuit decision, which held that plaintiffs in related cases could
use internal tobacco documents, gave British solicitors a hope for
success when bringing their case before a court in the United
Kingdom. 2 90
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
gave even more hope to litigants that as in the United States, the
291
tobacco industry could be held liable in the United Kingdom.
Clearly, the British system would not have allowed for the
extensive discovery that took place in the United States.
Therefore, success in obtaining discovery in the United States
meant that litigants in the United Kingdom would have access to
those documents. U.S. discovery likely allowed litigants in the

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. The court observed this fact in the opinion. Id.
285. Audra A. Albright, Comment, Could This be the Last Gasp? England's
First Case Against the British Tobacco Industry, 11 TEMP. INTIL & COMP. L.J. 363,
363-64 (1997). The comment notes that tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom
came after the Cipollone v. Ligett Group decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
The suit was a landmark case in the United States, which allowed plaintiffs to sue
the tobacco industry for its deceptive practices. Id. at 364.
286. Id. at 363. The suit was filed by forty-seven former smokers in the
United Kingdom. Id.
287. Id. at 372-375 (discussing the history of the conditional fee in the
United Kingdom and its impact on tobacco litigation).
288. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
289. Albright, supranote 285, at 384.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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B. Are Guns the Next Tobacco?
Following the success of tobacco litigation in the United
States, Unites States cities are filing suits against gun
manufacturers. 2 9 2 The same health and safety concerns that
2 93
fueled the waves of tobacco litigation are fueling gun litigation.
Guns are lethal and pose a serious health and safety hazard,
particularly where children are concerned. Similarly, the dangers
of smoking and youth were a primary concern in tobacco
litigation and regulation. The failure of Congress to successfully
regulate guns has again resulted in the people turning to the
judiciary to remedy a societal wrong.2 94 Litigation worked with
tobacco when Congress failed, so logically it might work with
guns.
Gun lawsuits are being brought on the same types of theories
behind tobacco litigation. 2 95 For example, in California, plaintiffs'
attorneys are turning to the Unfair Business Practices Act, which
was used against the tobacco industry.2 96
Gunmakers are
297
accused of the negligent design and distribution of guns.
Specifically the suits focus on the gun manufacturers'
responsibility for the misuse of guns because the guns are
missing adequate safety features. 2 98 Reckless marketing claims
rely on the notion that gunmakers were aware of the missing
safety features and continued to market guns as being safe,
29 9
when, in fact, they were not.

292.
See Rinat Fried, Gunmakers Face High-CaliberLaw, RECORDER, May
26, 1999, at 1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, RECORDER File; see also Adam Jones, U.S.
Cities Take British Gunmakers to Court, TIMES (London), May 27, 1999, LEXIS,
News Library, TIMES (London) File. Both articles discuss the lawsuits filed in U.S.
courts against gun manufacturers.
293.
Fried, supranote 292.
294.
Jones, supra note 292. San Francisco city attorney, Louise Renne, is
cited in the article as asserting that the goal of the lawsuits is to restrict sales
policies and require manufacturers to install safety mechanism in guns to prevent
accidental discharge. Id.
295.
Fried, supra note 292.
296.
Fried, supra note 292. According to the article, the Unfair Business
Practices Act, which prohibits businesses from engaging in "unfair, unlawful or
deceptive trade practices," was behind the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'s decision to
abandon the Joe Camel advertising campaign. Id.
297. Jones, supranote 292.
298.
See Jones, supranote 292.
299.
Fried, supra note 292 (explaining that the San Francisco suit claims
that gun manufacturers sold unsafe guns and illegally marketed them as safe).
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The allegations will require extensive discovery. 30 0 To prove
their claims, plaintiffs' attorneys will have to obtain industry
documents that demonstrate gun manufacturers had knowledge
of the safety hazards of guns and failed to correct the problems by
installing appropriate safety features in guns. 0 1
Similarly,
plaintiffs' attorneys in tobacco litigation relied on industry
documents to prove their case that cigarette manufacturers were
aware of the health hazards of smoking and failed to warn the
30 2
public.
The problems that the plaintiffs' attorneys faced in obtaining
discovery from the tobacco industry may await the plaintiffs'
attorney in gun litigation.3 0 3 In fact, gun manufacturing is not an
exclusively domestic industry.3 0 4 Many of the gun manufacturers
facing suits are actually British corporations.3 0S
Therefore,
extraterritorial discovery will undoubtedly play a role in gun
lawsuits.
In light of the United Kingdom's extraterritorial
discovery policy and considering the involvement of British
defendants, despite the negative British opinion about American
306
gun culture, discovery may prove to be difficult.
The impact of British discovery procedures on gun litigation
in the United States may never be made manifest, however. In
March of 2000, Smith & Wesson, the British-owned, largest gun
manufacturer in the Unites States, agreed to a deal with the U.S.
government regarding gun control measures.3 0 7 As a result of the
agreement, Smith & Wesson was dropped from pending litigation
against many gun manufacturers in the Unites States.3 0 8 The
deal was made specifically with the Department of Housing and

300. Id. (noting that the San Francisco city attorney must conduct
"extensive discovery into the business practices of gun companies" to prove the
claims).
301. Id.
302. Ciresi, supranote 255, at 479.
303. Fried, supra note 292.
304. Tom Diaz, Gun Industry Marketing of Lethality, BRIEF, Fall 1999, at 20.
Between 1899 and 1945, 4.6% of all guns in the U.S. market were imported
compared with the 1990s during which imported guns comprised one third to one
half of the market. Id.
305. Jones, supra note 292. Gun manufacturers facing lawsuits include
Heckler & Koch, and the largest gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson, both of
which are owned by British companies. Id. British Aerospace, through its
subsidiary Royal Ordinance, owns Heckler & Koch, while United Kingdom
conglomerate Tomkins owns Smith & Wesson. Id. As well, the Italian company
Beretta and the Austrian company Glock also manufacture guns. Id.
306. Fried, supra note 292. The article points out that 'no such treasure
trove" as the damaging records uncovered in the Minnesota tobacco case has been
found yet in gun litigation. Id.
307. Ben Macintyre, Shooting from the lip over right to bear arms, TIMES
(London), Mar. 25, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, TIMES (London) File.
308. Carla Crowder Scripps, Backlash Hits S&W Deal on Gun Safety,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 24, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, COMMERCIAL APPEAL File.
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Urban Development along with 29 U.S. cities and states.3 0 9 In
the deal, Smith & Wesson agreed to include locking devices on
guns, restrict multiple sales, and manufacture new "smart
guns"3 10 which can only be fired by their owners through the use
of personalized, coded signals. 31 1 Smith & Wesson seemed to
have no choice but to make an agreement because, unlike
3 12
tobacco, it lacks the resources to finance a legal battle.
Although Smith & Wesson settled, possibly putting an end to gun
litigation as other manufacturers follow their move, 3 13 similar
litigation against another industry in the future may not end so
easily.

VI. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION: PROPOSING AN
AMENDMENT TO THE EVIDENCE ACT OF 1975

The Evidence Act does not allow English judges much room
Strict
in granting extraterritorial discovery requests.3 14
adherence to the specificity requirement means that some
evidence may never be obtained for use at trial. By the time a
request is rewritten to meet the British specificity requirement, it
will likely be too late for a plaintiff. Tobacco litigation and the
new gun litigation present serious policy concerns. The health
and safety of the public is at the heart of this litigation. It is in
the interest of the entire international community to aid litigants
in bringing these suits so that governments will be forced to
reform their policies regarding these industries.
In formulating a solution, however, it is important to keep in
the forefront the interests and sovereignty of the states involved.
Therefore, a reasonable option would be an amendment to the
Evidence Act which would allow English courts great discretion in
In the narrow line of
applying the specificity requirement.
industry-wide tort cases such as tobacco and gun litigation,
British courts should be permitted to expand the specificity
requirement to allow the more liberal discovery of evidence. Such

309. Id. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's argument
for relief from gun manufacturers on behalf of public housing residents is based
on allegations that gun manufacturers produced and distributed unsafe guns.
Macintyre, supra note 307.
310. Macintyre, supranote 307.
311.
Scripps, supranote 308.
312. Id. This article describes gun control advocates as "taking a leaf from
the book of tobacco litigation" in their suits against gun manufacturers. Id.
313. Philip Delves Broughton, International:Smith & Wesson Fits Child Locks
to Stay Out of Court, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 18, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH File.

314.

See discussion supraPart IV.B.A.
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an amendment is needed because in industry-wide tort litigation
all the evidence is often in the possession of the defendant in the
form of industry documents.
Therefore, it is unlikely that
plaintiffs will know exactly what documents they are searching for
without the aid of whistle-blowers. The "smoking gun" they need
to make their case is hidden in extensive reserves of industry
documents. Furthermore, in an age of globalization, companies,
such as tobacco companies, can manipulate the international
legal system to hide documents in their U.K. offices or
subsidiaries, making it almost impossible for American litigants
to satisfy the British specificity requirement and get the
documents.
Such an amendment would not interfere with the British
reservation regarding pretrial discovery. The amendment need
only deal with evidence required for trial. It would, therefore,
prevent the harm done by decisions such as the one in the

Minnesota case.3 1 5 Rather than the lengthy process of the British
court sending an otherwise acceptable letter of request back
because the questions are too broad, it may grant the request if it
sees fit.3

16

If there is no penalty a foreign party or witness may

face for disclosing the requested document or giving the requested
testimony, then an amendment granting greater discretion to the
British court would only benefit the process. In addition, the
litigation will likely occur in the United States, where a liberal
process already exists. No harm would come to the British courts
as they would not be responsible for the litigation.
An amendment leaving the decision to execute a request
under a more liberal specificity requirement would respect the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom. The court could ultimately
determine that such a decision is not in the interest of the United
Kingdom, or greatly conflicts with its laws. The opportunity,
however, would exist for U.S. litigants to present the policy
arguments and case-specific reasons why such a decision is
necessary. In cases, such as tobacco and gun litigation, a strict
rule obstructs U.S. procedure and deprives an American litigant
of his fair day in court by denying him much needed evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION

The differences between U.S. and British methods of
discovery create international disputes when extraterritorial

315. See discussion supra Part V.A.l.b (discussing the impact of the
specificity requirement on a Minnesota letter of request for testimony in England).
316.
See id.
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The Convention sought to resolve
discovery is requested.
by establishing a uniform
disputes
discovery
extraterritorial
Although great
procedure for obtaining evidence abroad.
not all
Convention,
the
through
achieved
was
compromise
problems were resolved. The negative attitude towards American
style civil procedure on the part of the United Kingdom continues
to exist. The United Kingdom voiced its disapproval of the
American methods of discovery at the Convention, and that
opinion is embodied in the Evidence Act.
The British hostility toward American discovery causes its
courts to reject many American requests for discovery in the
The judicial
United Kingdom for fear of fishing expeditions.
system in the United States is frustrated when vital discovery
requests are denied by a foreign court. The system appears most
frustrated in industry-wide tort litigation such as tobacco and
gun litigation. The purpose of these types of suits is to protect
the public and urge the legislature to regulate harmful products
to make them safer. It is in the interest of the international
community to support these lawsuits with liberal discovery
because promoting disclosure will benefit public health and
safety.
Keeping in mind the interests of the United States and the
United Kingdom, the best solution appears to be an amendment
to the Evidence Act. An amendment allowing the British courts
discretion in expanding the specificity requirement, when
confronted with a letter of request in an industry-wide tort case,
would serve the international public interest. More importantly,
however, the discretion would be left to the British court to
protect the interests and sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
Such an amendment will reflect both comity and sovereignty.
Without an amendment, corporate defendants will continue to
hold all the evidence, and letters of request that would otherwise
be granted will be denied for lack of specificity. Consequently, it
is imperative that a solution be achieved to deal with the new
extraterritorial discovery challenges presented when an industry
conspires to hide information from the public at the expense of
It remains to be seen how the
their health and safety.
international community will address this new challenge.
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